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Fully Armed: Kamenev and Pravda in March 1917 
 
 
Immediately following the overthrow of the tsar in early March 1917, 
several senior Bolsheviks returning from internal exile in Siberia – Lev 
Kamenev, Koba Stalin, and Matvei Muranov – arrived in Petrograd and 
promptly took over the editorial direction of the recently resuscitated 
Pravda. What line did they take on the burning questions of the day? Did 
prewar Bolshevism give them adequate intellectual tools to forge a politi-
cal line both realistic and revolutionary? 
An answer to these questions can be found in a short editorial on 14 
March that announced the arrival of the new editorial team. Although un-
signed, it is almost certainly the work of Lev Kamenev. According to al-
most any secondary source you pick up, during this period Kamenev ad-
vocated something that was later termed “critical support” of the Provi-
sional Government. And indeed, you can find the words “criticize” and 
“support” in this editorial: 
 
Just as we will energetically support [the new government] in 
the complete liquidation of the old regime and the monarchy, in the 
implementation of freedoms, etc., we will just as energetically crit-
icize each failure of the Provisional Government to act on its de-
clared intentions [neposledovatelnost], each deviation from deci-
sive struggle, each attempt to tie the hands of the narod or to put 
out the raging revolutionary fire. 
 
Kamenev’s implied strategy seems neither realistic nor revolutionary. 
The elite-dominated Provisional Government was not going to carry out 
basic popular demands for liberty, land or peace. To situate oneself as 
some sort of loyal opposition to this government also meant shirking the 
revolutionary task of replacing it with a vlast (sovereign authority) based 
on the people. No wonder Kamenev has been called a “semi-Menshevik.” 
The real story of Bolshevism in 1917 evidently starts only in April, after 
Lenin’s arrival in Russia. 
But here is the rub. You get one impression of Kamenev’s argument if 
the passage just quoted is the only knowledge you have of the editorial. 
You would have an entirely different impression if all you knew of the 
editorial was, say, the following: 
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We must realize that the paths of democratic forces and of the 
Provisional Government will diverge – that when the bourgeoisie 
comes to its senses, it will inevitably attempt to halt the revolution-
ary movement and not permit it to develop to the point of satisfying 
the essential needs of the proletariat and the peasantry. . . . This full 
satisfaction of their demands is possible only when full and com-
plete vlast [vsia polnota vlasti] is in their own hands. Insofar as the 
revolution is going to develop and to deepen, it will come to this, to 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. 
 
On the basis of this passage, one would argue that from the very be-
ginning of the revolution, the Bolsheviks wagered on the inevitability of a 
clash between the Provisional Government and the people or narod – a 
clash that would lead directly to the replacement of the Provisional Gov-
ernment by some sort of revolutionary vlast based directly on the workers 
and peasants. And since this is exactly what happened, it was a pretty 
good wager. 
Which impression is closer to the correct one? The Pravda editorial is 
a short document, and I have provided a translation (as far as I know, the 
first in English) at the end of this article. I will argue that the second of 
the two quoted passages gives us the key to the Bolshevik outlook in 
March 1917. Let me preface my remarks by stating my conviction that 
correct interpretation of this document is crucial for an understanding of 
Bolshevik policies and the dynamics of the 1917 revolution. And for this 
reason, we should look carefully at the Pravda editorial entitled “The 
Provisional Government and Revolutionary Social Democracy.” 
 
Development and deepening of the revolution  
Kamenev gives us a scenario of how the revolution will “develop and 
deepen” (the word “develop” is a key one in the editorial). This focus on 
the process of revolution gives us a general idea of the time-frame for his 
scenario. If the 1905 revolution began on Bloody Sunday in January 
1905, then ten months passed until the first major climax of the revolution 
(the October Manifesto) and about thirty months until the final end of the 
revolutionary era (Stolypin’s mini-coup d’état in June 1907).   
Thus, when Kamenev predicts the eventual replacement of the Provi-
sional Government by a vlast based on the workers and peasants, he is not 
thinking in terms of hours, days or weeks (as were some eager Bolshevik 
activists in Petrograd) nor was he thinking in terms of a stable regime 
lasting for years and decades. He was evidently thinking in terms of 
months. 
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The scenario set forth by Kamenev is very straightforward and unam-
biguous. We may paraphrase it as follows: The revolution was carried out 
by workers and peasants, but the vlast ended up in the hands of a Provi-
sional Government that represented the liberal wing of elite society. Un-
der the pressure of the people, kicking and screaming, the Provisional 
Government is at present still carrying out the necessary task of rooting 
out the remains of the old regime – and, obviously, this is a good thing. 
But the bourgeoisie will come to its senses sooner rather than later and 
will then seek to halt the revolution in its tracks. 
The workers and peasants must be ready for this inevitable outcome. 
They must keep a vigilant and suspicious eye on the activity of the Provi-
sional Government. They must preach absolute mistrust [absoliutnoe ne-
doverie] in the promises not only of the liberals but also of the advocates 
of compromise. And they must energetically organize their own forces in 
preparation for the great showdown. 
And that day will come soon, very soon. The dynamic forces pushing 
the revolution forward with incredible speed are working for us. The Pro-
visional Government is objectively incapable of satisfying the demands of 
the narod, and the narod will soon realize this fact. And when this reali-
zation sinks in, the task of taking the vlast into the hands of the people 
will become practical politics. 
The thrust of Kamenev’s scenario would be even more evident if we 
italicize some small but important words. To think about replacing the 
Provisional Government right now (seichas) would be a mistake. The 
Provisional Government has not tried to halt the revolution because it 
does not yet have the power to do so. But the Provisional Government’s 
counter-revolutionary essence will inevitably manifest itself in the near 
future.  
 
Poskolku-postolku (insofar as) 
If Kamenev’s editorial advocated replacing the Provisional Govern-
ment with a peasant-worker vlast, then why are we so strongly assured by 
writers on the topic that it did the opposite? The main answer to this ques-
tion is easy enough: the majority of those who have purported to analyze 
it have not read the entire page-and-a-half editorial. They are under the 
impression that Kamenev used the phrase “critical support” (in any event, 
this phrase is often supplied with quotation marks). At best, they have 
read the sentence quoted earlier, in which Kamenev says that the workers 
will give their support to objectively anti-tsarist acts by the Provisional 
Government, while continuing to criticize and expose. 
If this sentence represented Kamenev’s entire scenario, the description 
of him as a “semi-Menshevik” would be correct – indeed, we could drop 
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the “semi.” But clearly, Kamenev was here describing only the opening 
phase of a rapidly developing revolutionary process. In Kamenev’s sce-
nario, this revolutionary process will quickly produce open conflict, prep-
aration for battle, and replacement of the Provisional Government by a 
worker-peasant vlast based on the soviets. 
We should recall the concrete circumstances when, two weeks after the 
fall of the tsar, Kamenev wrote this editorial. The great mass of soldiers 
and workers, newly awakened to political life, still trusted the new Provi-
sional Government and its seemingly excellent anti-tsarist credentials. 
This trust was not just based on a deluded burst of revolutionary good 
feeling, as we usually describe the situation with more than a little conde-
scension. The fact of the matter is that in this slice of time, the Provision-
al Government was actually carrying out revolutionary measures: disman-
tling the tsarist police apparatus, releasing political prisoners, setting up 
guarantees of basic political freedoms, laying the groundwork for national 
elections, and so forth.
1
 When Lenin returned in April, he famously said 
that Russia was now one of the freest countries in the world. He knew 
whereof he spoke. 
What was an aggressively left-wing political party to say when asked 
about its attitude toward a “bourgeois” Provisional Government acting in 
a progressive way? Deny that policies such as ending censorship was a 
good thing? Tell the enthusiastic workers and soldiers “we don’t support 
anything done by this government, even otherwise laudable measures.” 
Both these approaches seem like dead ends. 
A better approach is to admit the obvious – the Provisional Govern-
ment is carrying out measures that strengthen the revolution – but in the 
most grudging way possible. Yes, yes, the bourgeois government is doing 
some good things, but – against its will, only at the behest of the workers 
and peasants, and only insofar as the masses keep up the pressure. And no 
amount of pressure will keep this government from turning actively coun-
ter-revolutionary. No amount of pressure will get it to fulfill the demands 
of the people. Yes, of course, we support specific actions, but not the 
politicians forced to carry out these actions. “We will keep our hands un-
tied,” ready to withdraw our support and go on the offensive, because de-
cisive battles loom ahead. 
There is another reason why an inattentive reader might by misled by 
Kamenev’s editorial: the presence of words and phrases that later became 
strongly associated with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries 
                                                 
1. One of the best descriptions of the policies of the Provisional Government in its 
first weeks is by the Soviet historian V. I. Startsev in Vnutrenniaia politika Vremen-
nogo Pravitel’stva (Domestic Policy of the Provisional Government) (Leningrad: 
Nauka, 1980). 
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who did provide crucial “critical support” for the Provisional Govern-
ment: “insofar as” (the famous poskolku-postolku), kontrol, and perhaps 
even “demands.” Such readers draw a straight line from the presence of 
such vocabulary items to a specific political strategy, without paying at-
tention to the actual argument. 
A fundamental choice faced the socialist parties in 1917: either to sup-
port the Provisional Government and, more widely, to try to keep at least 
some portion of educated elite society on the side of the revolution – or to 
aim at replacing the Provisional Government with some sort of narodnaia 
vlast, some sort of sovereign authority based on the workers and peasants, 
no matter what opposition arose from any and all segments of elite socie-
ty. This fundamental political choice gives meaning to the vocabulary and 
not the other way around. This maxim is especially true in the early days 
of the revolution, before the phrases became strongly associated with one 
or another party. 
Take poskolku-postolku, for instance. This phrase bubbled to the sur-
face during the first hours of the creation of the new regime, when the re-
lationship between Soviet and Provisional Government was still being de-
fined. The constituents of the Soviet, the Petrograd workers and soldiers, 
pledged support for the Provisional Government “insofar as” (poskolku-
postolku) the government carried out a revolutionary program. In a way 
that was only intuited at the time; this was an exercise in sovereignty: we, 
the members of the Soviet, have the real vlast, and we are delegating you, 
the government, to carry out our program. 
This phrase became associated with those socialists who desperately 
wanted the arrangement with the Provisional Government to work, who 
made it their mission to mobilize popular support for it. Look (they said), 
you can trust this government, “bourgeois” as it undoubtedly is, because 
it knows it will have our support only insofar as it carries out a revolu-
tionary program. And this would have been a convincing argument – ex-
cept for the growing evidence that the Provisional Government did not 
want to carry out a revolutionary program and was energetically search-
ing for ways to free itself from any need for support from the soviets. 
One could argue that the Bolsheviks were the only party to take seri-
ously the strategy of “insofar as” – the only one that was genuinely pre-
pared to turn against the government if it failed to carry out the revolu-
tionary program. Or rather, as Kamenev’s editorial demonstrates, they 
maintained from the beginning that the Provisional Government had nei-
ther the desire nor the ability to accomplish popular demands, so that any 
support based on the logic of “insofar as” would be fleeting at best. 
The same with kontrol and “criticism”: these words take on a very dif-
ferent connotation when used by people on opposite sides of the funda-
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mental choice.  Kontrol (like French contrôle) can best be translated into 
English by something like “supervision”: keeping tabs on what was hap-
pening, making sure the Provisional Government was not getting away 
with anything. For someone whose basic perspective was support for the 
Provisional Government, kontrol was a means of reassurance: look, 
we’re keeping an eye on these guys, they won’t try anything outrageous, 
so there’s no need to overthrow them.  
For someone whose basic perspective was replacement of the Provi-
sional Government, kontrol was a means of exposure: look, we’re keep-
ing an eye on these home-grown imperialists to find out whether they’re 
making any serious moves toward peace or giving land to the peasants – 
and we’re here to tell you that, as predicted, they’re doing just the oppo-
site. 
Similarly, when socialists like Kamenev talk about making “de-
mands,” they intended to use them as a means of exposure. As Kamenev 
asserted in his April debates with Lenin: 
 
Should we, as a political party, take on ourselves to demand the 
publication of the secret treaties – announce that this is our political 
demand? People will say to me: excuse me, you’re demanding 
something impossible. But the demands I make are not founded on 
the expectation that Miliukov will respond to me and publish the 
treaties. The policy of making demands that I am advocating is an 
agitational device for the development of the masses, a method of 
exposure of the fact that Guchkov and Miliukov cannot do this, that 
they do not want the publication of the secret treaties, that they are 
against the policy of peace. It is a device for showing the masses 
that if they really want to create a revolutionary policy on an inter-





Misleading Approaches  
In a standard work on the evolution of Bolshevism, Robert Daniels 
writes that “the February Revolution caught the Bolsheviks completely 
off guard. The assumption of power by a conservative middle-class re-
gime, supposedly impossible, made Lenin’s doctrine of the ‘democratic 
dictatorship’ meaningless.”
3
 This is exactly 180° wrong. In actuality, 
                                                 
2. As cited in Lars T. Lih, “The Ironic Triumph of Old Bolshevism: The Debates 
of April 1917 in Context,” Russian History 38 (2011): 228. 
3. Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Russia, p. 38 (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960). For a recent affirmation of this approach, 
see Christopher Read, Lenin (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 154. 
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prewar Bolshevism provided the party with a solid strategic orientation 
for the 1917 revolution. 
Bolshevism did not primarily make a prediction about the day after the 
fall of the tsar, but rather proposed a scenario of the “active forces” of 
Russian society, joined to a corresponding strategy for carrying the revo-
lution “to the end” (do kontsa), that is, for achieving the maximum possi-
ble revolutionary transformation of Russia (due to the vagaries of Marxist 
jargon, the target of achieving the maximum possible was termed “the 
minimum program”). The key task mandated by this strategy was the cre-
ation of a revolutionary government, a narodnaia vlast, with the socialist 
proletariat providing leadership and the peasants providing a majority 
base. 
And why was such a revolutionary government needed? Because anti-
tsarist elite forces would attempt to take control of the revolution and to 
stop it way short of the fulfillment of popular demands. These elite forces 
wanted to go beyond tsarism only to the extent that their own interests 
were served, while preventing any dangerous concessions to the anti-
capitalist workers or the anti-landowner peasants. 
If the Bolshevik scenario did contain a prediction about the day after 
the fall of tsarism, it was this: anti-tsarist liberals will try to seize control 
of the revolution and will then try to halt or reverse the revolution as it 
deepens and develops. As can be easily seen, exactly this prediction in-
forms Kamenev’s article. I leave readers to decide whether the prediction 
was an accurate one. 
Other knowledgeable observers say that Kamenev and his colleagues 
Stalin and Muranov imposed a “sharp turn to the right,” signaled by edi-
torials such as the one under review.
4
 This assertion is an advance over 
Daniels, since it recognizes that there were Bolsheviks who called for re-
placement of the Provisional Government by a narodnaia vlast. Never-
theless, it is seriously misleading. 
It has been my experience that when historians of 1917 rely in their 
analyses on such contrasting pairs as “right/left,” “moderate/radical,” 
“softline/hardline,” and “pragmatic/extremist,” the result is usually 
vagueness and confusion. There was a wide variety of issues, disputes 
and clashes, and the right/left spectrum can mean something very differ-
ent in each case – if indeed it means anything at all. In the case before us, 
the idea that Kamenev’s editorial represents a “sharp turn to the right” 
seems to arise from a confusion of two issues: 
– should we or should we not strive for a worker-peasant vlast that will 
replace the Provisional Government? 
                                                 
4. Alexander Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and 
the July 1917 Uprising (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1968), p. 36. 
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– should we or should we not go out in the streets to replace the Provi-
sional Government today? 
The first issue is the same fundamental choice discussed earlier. The 
second issue only makes sense within the framework of agreement about 
the fundamental choice. I can see how we might describe the first and 
more fundamental choice in terms of “right” and “left,” although I do not 
find such descriptive terms very useful. But I see no reason to analyze 
disputes of the second kind in similar terms. Two equally left-radical-
extremist activists can disagree over whether actual conditions are ripe 
for an uprising or not. 
The first reaction of some Bolsheviks in Petrograd after the fall of the 
tsar was to call for the instant establishment of the worker-peasant gov-
ernment mandated by the prewar Bolshevik scenario. This call was ex-
pressed in an editorial in the very first issue of Pravda on 5 March, where 
we read this stirring call to action: “All over Russia the Red Flag of 
Revolution is being raised. The whole narod is taking its fate into its 
hands. There can be no turning back.” This editorial does not mention the 
existence of either the Soviet or the Provisional Government. The fact 
that the mass-based Soviet was freely offering support to the Provisional 
Government was a surprise and a disorienting one. We can see this in the 
anguished complaints of Bolsheviks in the early days that “we wuz 
robbed” because of irregularities in elections to Soviet leadership bodies. 
So an adjustment was needed to accommodate these unexpected reali-
ties. But the adjustment was hardly a profound one – in any event, it was 
made by the time Kamenev published his editorial on 14 March. By this 
time, the fact of genuine Soviet support for the new government had been 
assimilated. Furthermore, Kamenev and the other returning Bolsheviks 
were thinking in national terms, and they realized that the provinces were 
even less ready to support a worker-peasant vlast. 
The needed adjustment certainly did not consist of abandoning the 
goal of a worker-peasant vlast, that is, of switching to the other side of the 
fundamental divide (as is implied by calling the adjustment “a sharp turn 
to the right”). Rather, it consisted of saying to fellow Bolsheviks: we do 
not have the mass support to replace the Provisional Government today, 
and it would be disorganizing in the extreme to make a premature at-
tempt. But do not lose heart: events are working for us, and when the 
counter-revolutionary nature of the Provisional Government is exposed 
for all to see, we will obtain the needed mass support. It will come to this, 
to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. 
The Pravda editorial in the first issue said “The whole narod is taking 
its fate into its hands.” As if in response, Kamenev wrote “only then, 
when the Provisional Government of the liberals has exhausted itself be-
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fore the face of the democracy [that is, the narod] of Russia, will the 
question of the transfer of vlast into its own hands stand before the de-
mocracy as a practical question.” 
Other informed observers lay heavy stress on the fact that the prewar 
Bolshevik scenario called for a democratic revolution, and therefore, they 
claim, it was a radically inadequate orientation for the socialist October 
revolution. The danger of this approach is that it obscures the really fun-
damental question (the goal of a worker-peasant vlast) in order to focus 
on something much less fundamental (the exact program of such a vlast). 
The prewar Bolshevik scenario called for a government based on the 
workers and peasants, and therefore hostile to the elite, to carry out a vast 
revolutionary transformation of Russia. The exact nature of this transfor-
mation, the proper Marxist label for it, is a question that could and inevi-
tably would be worked out only in practice. In Lenin’s lifetime, as he 
himself recognized, the actual accomplishments of the revolution – as op-
posed to goals for the future – were much more impressive on the “demo-
cratic” side of the ledger (land to the peasants, civil and national equality, 
and the like) than on the “socialist.” Kamenev’s editorial talked about 
“the revolution,” without giving it a learned label, and this, I think, was 
the proper approach under the circumstances 
We can disagree on the question of how vital it was that, for example, 
nationalization of the banks was included as part of the Bolshevik pro-
gram in 1917. Where there is less room for disagreement is over this 
question: is an orientation toward a socialist revolution a necessary pre-
condition for a revolutionary drive to replace the Provisional Government 
with a worker-peasant vlast that would carry out the revolution to the 
end? Kamenev’s editorial of 14 March seems to me to be fairly conclu-
sive evidence that the answer is “no.” 
 
Fully Armed 
As I remarked in the beginning, getting Kamenev’s editorial of 14 
March 1917 right is crucial for a correct understanding of the dynamic of 
the revolution. One reason for this is the profound difficulties that the edi-
torial creates for the widespread approaches to Bolshevism in 1917 that I 
have just critiqued. But the appearance of this editorial also marks a sig-
nificant date in the evolution of Bolshevism.  
From the beginning of the revolution, the Bolsheviks possessed a solid 
strategic orientation based on a long-standing account of Russia’s “active 
forces.” In order to be fully armed for the battles ahead, they needed to 
absorb an unexpected reality: although a soviet network with strong mass 
support was in place, the soviets were reluctant to assume “full and com-
plete vlast” (vsia polnota vlasti). Speaking at a session of the Petersburg 
64                                                                      The NEP Era: Soviet Russia 1921-1928 
Bolshevik Committee on 18 March, Kamenev pointed to this situation in 




After pointing out the role of the Bolsheviks and then their in-
significant influence in the Petrograd Soviet at the present moment, 
he [Kamenev] examined this incongruity: It is surprising that the 
Bolsheviks are not occupying a dominant position in the Petrograd 
Soviet of Worker and Soldier Deputies – and why do they allow in-
to the Soviet the liquidators, who do not express the outlook of the 
Petrograd workers? We are the representatives of the revolutionary 
element in Petrograd, but in the meantime, it seems that the wide 
masses do not understand us. Evidently, since we are essentially 
correct, we are formulating our resolutions and decisions in a way 
that the masses do not understand.  
If we are correct in calling the Provisional Government counter-
revolutionary, then, clearly, we should overthrow it and institute a 
new, revolutionary one. Therefore, either we should declare open 
war on the Provisional Government, or we should take up some 
other position in regard to it. The latter is just what is necessary. 
Have we developed to the point that we can create the dictatorship 
of the proletariat? No. What is important is not taking power – 
what is important is keeping it. [Nevazhno–vziat’ vlast, vazhno–
uderzhat’.] This moment will come, but it will be advantageous for 
us to put it off, since right now our forces are still inadequate.  
 
By 14 March, when Kamenev’s editorial was published, the necessary 
adjustment had been made: a wager on an inevitable clash between Provi-
sional Government and the Soviet—a clash that ensured that the counter-
revolutionary nature of the Provisional Government would be exposed for 
all to see, so that the masses would move forward and take the vlast into 










                                                 
5. Pervyi legal’nyi PK Bol’shevikov v 1917 g. (Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1927), pp. 49-
50. 
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Kamenev’s Pravda Editorial of 14 March 1917: Translation 
 
The Provisional Government and Revolutionary Social Democracy 
The Provisional Government, created by the revolution, is much more 
moderate than the forces that gave it birth. The workers and the peasants 
dressed in soldier’s greatcoats were the ones who created the revolution. 
But in formal terms the vlast passed into the hands, not of the representa-
tives of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry, but of people pushed 
forward by the liberal movement of the class of property-owners. The 
proletariat and the peasantry and the army composed of these classes will 
consider the revolution now begun as completed only when it has satis-
fied their demands entirely and in full – when all remnants of the former 
regime, economic as well as political, have been torn up to their very 
roots. This full satisfaction of their demands is possible only when full 
and complete vlast [vsia polnota vlasti] is in their own hands. Insofar as 
the revolution is going to develop and to deepen, it will come to this, to 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.  
In contrast, the Provisional Government, in accordance with the social 
nature of the strata from which it came, would like to hold back the de-
velopment of the revolution at its first steps. If they haven’t done so as 
yet, it is only because they don’t have the strength for it.  Balking, against 
their will, they are compelled under the pressure of the revolutionary 
narod to still go forward.  And for us, revolutionary Social Democrats, 
there is no need even to state that insofar as [poskolku . . . postolku] the 
Provisional Government actually struggles against the remnants of the old 
regime, to that extent it is assured of support from the revolutionary pro-
letariat.  Always and everywhere, when the Provisional Government, 
bowing to the will of revolutionary democracy, as represented by the So-
viet of Worker and Soldier Deputies, clashes with the reaction or the 
counter-revolution, the revolutionary proletariat must be ready with its 
support. 
But this is support of actions [delo] and not of persons – support, not 
of the given composition of the Provisional Government, but of those ob-
jectively revolutionary steps that it is compelled to take and to the extent 
that it actually undertakes them. 
Therefore our support should in no way tie our hands. Just as we will 
energetically support it in the complete liquidation of the old regime and 
the monarchy, in the implementation of freedoms, etc., we will just as en-
ergetically criticize each failure of the Provisional Government to act on 
its declared intentions [neposledovatelnost], each deviation from decisive 
struggle, each attempt to tie the hands of the narod or to put out the rag-
ing revolutionary fire. 
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We call upon the revolutionary democracy, headed by the proletariat, 
to the most unwearying kontrol on all the actions of the vlast, whether in 
the center or in the localities. We must realize that the paths of the de-
mocracy and of the Provisional Government will diverge – that, when the 
bourgeoisie comes to its senses, it will inevitably attempt to halt the revo-
lutionary movement and not permit it to develop to the point of satisfying 
the essential needs of the proletariat and the peasantry.   
We must be on the alert and ready to act. Calmly and cold-bloodedly 
weighing our forces, we must use all our energy to gather, organize and 
consolidate the revolutionary proletariat. But there is no reason to force 
events. They are developing with immense speed by themselves. 
And precisely for this reason, it would be a political mistake to pose 
the question right now of replacing the Provisional Government.   
The active forces of the great revolution are working for us; they are 
exposing the inadequacy and the limitations of any attempt to solve the 
tasks of the revolution by means of compromise. 
And only then, when the Provisional Government of the liberals has 
exhausted itself before the face of the democracy of Russia, will the ques-
tion of the transfer of vlast into its own hands stand before the democracy 
as a practical question. 
The slogan of the moment still remains: organization of the forces of 
the proletariat, consolidation of the forces of the proletariat, peasantry and 
army by means of the Soviets of Deputies, absolute lack of belief [ne-
doverie] in any liberal promises, the most constant kontrol on the imple-
mentation of our demands, an energetic support of each step that leads to 
the uprooting of all the remnants of the tsarist-landlord regime. 
 
Independent Scholar 
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Временное Правительство и  
революционная социал-демократия. 
 
«Правда» № 8, 14 марта 1917 г. статья. 
 
Временное Правительство, созданное революцией, гораздо уме-
реннее тех сил, которые его породили. Создали революцию рабочие 
и крестьяне, одетые в солдатские шинели. А формально власть пере-
шла в руки не представителей революционного пролетариата и 
крестьянства, а в руки людей, выдвинутых либеральным движением 
класса собственников. Пролетариат и крестьянство и составленная 
из них армия будут считать начавшуюся революцию завершенной 
лишь тогда, когда она удовлетворит целиком и полно их требования, 
когда все остатки былого режима будут до основания вырваны как в 
экономической, так и в политической области. Это полное удовлет-
ворение требований рабочих, крестьян и армии возможно лишь тог-
да, когда вся полнота власти будет в их собственных руках. По-
скольку революция будет развиваться и углубляться, она будет идти 
к этому, к диктатуре пролетариата и крестьянства. 
Наоборот, Временное Правительство, согласно с социальной при-
родой тех слоев, из которых оно вышло, склонно было бы задержать 
развитие революции на ее первых шагах. Если они еще не делают 
этого, то потому, что у них нет сил для этого. Упираясь и против 
воли они принуждены под давлением революционного народа идти 
все вперед. И нам, революционным социал-демократам, нет надоб-
ности даже и говорить о том, что поскольку это Временное Прави-
тельство действительно борется с остатками старого режима, по-
стольку ему обеспечена решительная поддержка революционного 
пролетариата. Всегда и повсюду, где Временное Правительство, по-
винуясь революционной демократии, представленной в Советах Ра-
бочих и Солдатских Депутатов, столкнется с реакцией или контр-
революцией, революционные пролетариат должен быть готов е его 
поддержке. 
Но это – поддержка дела, а не лиц, поддержка не данного состава 
Временного Правительства, а тех объективно-революционных ша-
гов, которые оно принуждено предпринимать и поскольку оно их 
предпринимает. 
Поэтому наша поддержка ни в какой мере не должна связывать 
нам рук. Столь же решительно как мы поддержим его в окончатель-
ной ликвидации старого режима, монархии, в осуществлении свобод 
и т.д., столь же решительно будем мы критиковать и разоблачать 
каждую непоследовательность Временного Правительства, каждое 
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уклонение его в сторону от решительной борьбы, каждую попытку 
связать руки народу или притушить разгорающийся революционный 
пожар. 
Мы призываем революционную демократию во главе с пролета-
риатом к самому неослабному контролю над всеми действиями вла-
сти, как в центре, так и на местах. 
Мы должны знать, что пути демократии и Временного Правитель-
ства разойдутся, что опомнившаяся буржуазия неизбежно попытает-
ся удержать революционное движение и не дать ему развиться до 
удовлетворения коренных нужд пролетариата и крестьянства. 
Мы должны быть настороже и наготове. Спокойно и хладнокров-
но взвешивая свои силы, мы должны всю свою энергию употребить 
на собрание, организацию и сплочение революционного пролетариа-
та. На незачем подгонять события. Они и так развиваются с велико-
лепной быстротой. 
И именно поэтому было бы политической ошибкой сейчас ста-
вить вопрос о смене Временного Правительства. 
Движущие силы великой революции за нас; они разоблачают 
недостаточность и ограниченность всякой попытки решить задачи 
революции путем компромисса. 
И только тогда, когда перед лицом демократии России исчерпает 
себя Временное Правительство либералов, станет перед ней, как 
вопрос практический, вопрос о переходе власти в ее собственные 
руки. 
Лозунгом же момента остается: организация сил пролетариата, 
сплочение сил пролетариата, крестьянства и армии в Советах Депу-
татов, абсолютное недоверие ко всяким либеральным посулам, са-
мый пристальный контроль над осуществлением наших требований, 
решительная поддержка каждого шага, ведущего к искоренению 
всех остатков царско-помещичьего режима. 
 
  
                             
